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Introduction
Writing for the majority in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 an
important first amendment case, Justice Brennan proclaimed a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 3 This commitment
is evidenced in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.4
First Amendment theory is discussed within the framework of two
competing models: the speech/individualist model and the struc-
tural/utilitarian model. The speech/individualist model stems from the
idea that freedom of expression is basic to every individual, not as a
means to some higher end, but as an end in itself. Justices Black and
Douglas, who believed that the First Amendment was an absolute com-
mand forbidding any restraint on speech and press, subscribed to this
view. Under the second model, claims for freedom of the press are
weighed against competing societal interests.'
The First Amendment has been described as basic to the existence of
constitutional democracy,6 essential to the nature of a free state,7 and the
primary instrument of self-governance.8 The citizen's ability to monitor
and direct government depend on the free speech right. To protect this
right and strengthen the First Amendment, we propose a federal Re-
porter's Privilege that would protect a reporter from being forced to dis-
close confidential sources or any unpublished information gathered for
the purpose of public dissemination.
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Id. at 270.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. See NELSON, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 2-14 (5th ed. 1986).
6. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (referring to
"the right to publish").
7. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-152 (referring to "liberty of the press").
8. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (referring to "free speech, free press and
free assembly").
TESTIMONIAL SHIELD STATUTE
The primary objective of a reporter's testimonial privilege or shield
law is to strengthen first amendment rights in times when intolerance of
unorthodox views is most prevalent and when governments are most
popular and/or most likely and able to stifle dissent. 9 Those are the
times when the danger of majoritarian and authoritarian tyranny over
ideas, expression of ideas, and individual development are greatest. To
protect against such tyranny, the standards governing the application of
the First Amendment should be so specific that a decision-maker's range
of discretion will be narrow.10 Constitutional standards that limit the
discretion of the decision maker are preferred to balancing tests, which
are unpredictable and arbitrary." We therefore advocate a privilege
that, with one narrow and easily identified exception, is absolute. 12
In order for the proposed Reporter's Testimonial Privilege to pro-
vide the protection it promises, it must be a federal law. 3 The uniform-
ity and universality of a federal statute will most effectively protect the
reception of important local, national, and international news. Without a
national statute or a dispositive Supreme Court decision on this issue,
9. See Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
449, 449-50 (1985). In Professor Blasi's view, portions of the Constitution, such as the Equal
Protection Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, Were intended to institu-
tionalize or channel progressive social and political change, but the speech, press, and assem-
bly clauses were intended to preserve dissent in times of intolerance.
10. See Note, Circumventing Branzburg: Absolute Protection for Confidential News
Sources, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 615 (1984). The author of the note argues that any qualified
newsgatherer's privilege is unpredictable and, consequently, the efficacy of the privilege is neg-
ligible. Id. at 635-37. To provide a "minimum of constitutional protection" and predictability,
he urges that courts recognize an absolute privilege against forced disclosure of the identity of
confidential sources. Id. at 615.
11. Id. at 638-39.
12. For a discussion arguing that no privilege is appropriate, see Bulger, Reporter's Privi-
lege by Rule of Court: New Approach Fails .. Or Does It?, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 513 (1985).
Bulger's analysis concludes that a shield law would frustrate an individual's interest in protect-
ing his or her reputation, the right to summon witnesses and to face his or her accusers, the
effectiveness of the grand jury system, and what Dean Wigmore calls the people's "'right to
every man's evidence.' "Id. at 513 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton's
rev. 1961)). Bulger further states that, according to opponents of the shield law, societal and
individual rights must be protected from an industry which seeks, in at least some important
respects, to operate above the law. Id. at 513-14.
13. See Note, Disclosure of Confidential Sources in International Reporting, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1631 (1987). The note, which focuses on libel suits brought by foreign plaintiffs, advo-
cates the enactment of a federal statute, because many controversies involving the disclosure of
confidential sources involve national and international organs of the news media. It is con-
cerned with the chilling effect on international reporting that results from the Branzburg bal-
ancing test. The three-prong test consists of these criteria: (1) relevance of the information
sought; (2) alternative means of obtaining the information; and (3) whether the need for the
information is compelling. Id. at 1648. Under the Branzburg test, reporters can promise confi-
dentiality only with the caution that a court, in unpredictable circumstances, might compel
disclosure.
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great threats to the independence and effectiveness of the press will re-
main and increase in what are essentially national newsgathering media.
These barriers to an effective press will hinder the ability to make in-
formed personal and community decisions.14 Uniformity of the protec-
tion afforded is essential to the free flow of information to the public.
It is important that the legislature and not the judiciary establish
this privilege. The Reporter's Testimonial Privilege is essentially a sub-
stantive law; the creation of testimonial privilege entails the weighing of
competing policy interests, which is a legislative and not a judicial func-
tion.15 The Supremacy Clause and the constitutional scheme as a whole
recognize that the legislature is more competent to balance such policy
interests. In addition to the myriad of personal benefits that emanate
from a free press, three other goals are served by a congressionally en-
acted reporter's privilege: (1) the continued independence of the judici-
ary from the influences of the political fray; 6 (2) the maintenance of the
system of checks and balances and the separation of powers;1 7 and
(3) the efficiency of government that would be promoted by the uniform-
ity and clarity of the statute. The privilege we propose protects the es-
sential right of freedom of speech, provides plaintiffs, defendants, and
sources alike with greater predictability of the law, and reflects the prin-
ciple of separation of powers.
Section I of this Article is an exposition of the importance of the
First Amendment in democratic society, its role in individual develop-
ment, and the validity of the currently unfashionable theory of the mar-
ketplace of ideas. The question of the meaning of the Press Clause of the
First Amendment has been raised since the early 1800s. Therefore, Sec-
14. There is a need for news about international events. International reporting, espe-
cially in countries with authoritarian regimes, relies heavily on sources who demand confiden-
tiality. The validity of this statement rests in significant part on the belief that the "truth" is
best discovered by the flourishing of a "marketplace of ideas."
15. See Day, Shield Laws and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 2 COM. & L. 1 (1980).
Day concludes that shield statutes creating a reporter's privilege are substantive or quasi-sub-
stantive. Id. at 14. These statutes entail legislative balancing of the public interest in protect-
ing a confidential relationship and promoting fair judicial proceedings based on all existing
evidence. He believes that qualified shield statutes are likely to avoid separation of powers
problems because the courts retain some control over source disclosure. Id. at 15.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Although the reporter's privilege is a substantive rule, it does have procedural effects.
Some might argue, therefore, that it implicates the separation of powers doctrine to some
extent. Our proposed privilege, although nearly absolute, would not interfere with the courts'
ability to compel testimony in the cases concerning the rights to life, life-long liberty, and
freedom of speech. No separation of powers problem exists in these areas because Congress
would merely be following the constitutionally and democratically established hierarchy of
rights. Nearly absolute and predictable though it may be, the proposed privilege is not devoid
of the flexibility needed by the courts to effectively carry out their constitutional obligations.
tion II is a brief history of the case law surrounding the privilege. Sec-
tion III outlines how various states have grappled with the tensions
between the First Amendment, the press' use of confidential sources, and
the individual's interests in privacy, reputation, due process, and life it-
self. The Model Reporter's Testimonial Privilege legislation is contained
in Section IV. The four sections that follow the proposal discuss the
authors' rationales for various portions of the privilege: Section V dis-
cusses the absolute nature of the privilege; Section VI discusses why the
privilege may be held only by those affiliated with the institutional news
media; Section VII discusses the scope of the model legislation; and Sec-
tion VIII discusses the application of the model legislation to criminal
and civil cases and administrative proceedings.
I. The Primacy of the First Amendment
Though men be much governed by interest, yet interest itself,
and all human affairs, are entirely governed by opinion.'"
David Hume
The Constitution... does not give equal status to the duty of self-
preservation and the duty of maintaining political freedom. On the
contrary, experiment in self-government makes freedom of speech
the primary freedom to be protected.' 9
Alexander Meiklejohn
The objective of a newsperson's privilege, which protects the confi-
dentiality of the relationship and information exchanged between a re-
porter and his source, is the protection of the free flow of information to
the public. The relationship between the press and its confidential
sources provides a means for the fulfillment of human potential-democ-
racy-which requires an educated and informed populace.2 °
History indicates that the First Amendment was intended to be
more than a codification of Blackstone's famous statement that "[t]he
liberty of the press.., consists in laying no previous restraint upon publi-
cations, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter [once the
information is] published."'" The freedoms of speech, press, and associa-
tion were narrow freedoms in eighteenth century England. It was, wrote
Justice Black, the desire to give the people of America greater protection
18. Hume, Of the First Principles of Government, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL & LIT-
ERARY 32 (E. Miller ed. 1985).
19. Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 461, 479
(1953).
20. See generally J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1916).
21. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *151-52.
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against the powerful federal government than the English had against
their government that caused the Framers to put these freedoms into the
Constitution.22 The evils the Framers sought to protect against were
those resulting from governmental action that might "pervert such free
and general discussion of public matters as seem absolutely essential to
prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens."23
The Framers sought to use the same instrument which empowered
the government to limit and control that government. The First Amend-
ment, without which the Constitution might not have been ratified,24 was
an expression of that value, commonly held by liberal thinkers of the
day.25 Unlike the authors of the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man, who extolled "free communication of thoughts and opinions,"
'26
the Framers wrote as lawyers, not as speculative philosophers. They
were more concerned with posting an enforceable legal rule than enunci-
ating an ideal. Hence, they wrote in terms of specific prohibitions.27
Through these prohibitions, the Founders elevated to a constitutional
plane the rights encompassed by the First Amendment. Thus, the free
speech and free press guarantees of the First Amendment are not merely
expressions of political ideals but limits on governmental action.2" These
protections and this view of freedom of the press have enabled us to
avoid the great deprivations of liberty that followed the French
Revolution. 29.
It is thus evident "that the First Amendment is the keystone of our
Government,"3 because the rights it guarantees are "basic and funda-
mental... to the preservation of the freedoms treasured in a democratic
society."3  The primacy of the First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and press was expounded by Justice Black, who wrote:
Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important
to the life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In
fact, this privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be
weakened; the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is
22. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1941).
23. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 421 (1868).
24. F. McDONALD, NovuS ORDO SECLORUM 143-83 (1985).
25. Id.
26. P. MIGUEL, HISTOIRE DE LA FRANCE 248-49 (1976).
27. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I, III, IV, and XIV.
28. J.R. CHAFEE, How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 48 (1952).
29. Id. at 51.
30. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
31. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
death.32
Without a free and fearless press the well-informed and sensible
opinions upon which democracy depends are impossible. Thus, the press
is the chief democratic instrument of freedom.33 Without it, the heart of
democracy is imperiled. Meiklejohn emphasized the primacy of political
speech when he stated that this freedom must be absolute in order for us
to maintain our political freedom.' What is political speech is to be
determined by the individual as he or she faces the exigencies of his or
her times; what is significant information to one person may seem banal
or trivial to another. Thus, in order to allow each person to decide for
himself or herself what is significant, almost all speech must be absolutely
protected. Likewise, an ill-informed democracy may in fact do injury to
itself, for it may take actions repugnant to the principles of liberalism and
human fulfillment.
To say that the primary value of a free press is its service to democ-
racy, however, is misleading. Democracy itself exists to facilitate the
maximum fulfillment of the individual who lives in a society. Therefore,
the primary value of a free press and of free speech in general must be the
facilitation of individual fulfillment. Thomas Jefferson expressed this
when he wrote: "Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a
government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."35
The impetus for suppression does not always come from the govern-
ment. Giving power to the people through judges and juries who impose
popularly supported sanctions against certain speech or publishers may
enable tyranny by the majority and thus discourage individual develop-
ment. Such tyranny destroys the marketplace of ideas and does a disser-
vice to the very end it aims to serve. Defamation is an example of a
difficult question involving popular control of speech because of the un-
predictability of what the group or jury may choose to impose on the
publisher. The protection of a free press is therefore a tool to restrain the
doctrinaire democratic and protect the rights of those not in the major-
ity.36 The press and the people act as competing members of the same
team to prevent democracy, "originally intended to prevent all arbitrary
32. MilkWagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1941)
(Black, J., dissenting).
33. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 181-90 (1941).
34. Meildejohn, supra note 19.
35. T. JEFFERSON, FOUR WRrriNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 359-60 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
36. For a description of the dogmatic democrat and the true liberal, see F. HAYEK, THE
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power," from becoming "the justification for a new arbitrary power."1
3 7
Democracy and human life are, above all, processes of forming opinions
and making decisions, and the new information used to form those opin-
ions must first appear somewhere. That somewhere is often in the insti-
tutional news media.
In some constitutional provisions, such as those governing privacy
38
and takings, 39 the Framers literally attempted to strike a balance between
authority and liberty. By contrast, in matters concerning the First
Amendment, the Framers emphasized individual liberty. Although the
First Amendment does not explicitly say that the press may refuse to
disclose information or the identity of the source of information, the
Constitution's scheme reveals how the press and its confidential relation-
ships should be viewed.
Within the structure of representative government, the citizen's
need for secrecy and confidentiality is, in some circumstances, as compel-
ling as his or her need for information. But the matter is not as simple as
balancing the interests of one individual against those of another or the
many. Consider the example of an informant who wants to keep his or
her identity confidential. Here one must balance the individual's interests
in secrecy with others' interest in the information. The focus in striking
the balance is not on the informant's personal interest in anonymity.
Rather, the focus is on the interests of the community in assuring the
anonymity of informants in order to facilitate the gathering of informa-
tion with which to make decisions and form opinions, thereby promoting
individual fulfillment and social harmony.'4 In the constitutional balanc-
ing of these interests, the First Amendment should play a dominant if
not decisive role.
Despite their essential contribution to individual fulfillment, neither
freedom of the press nor freedom of speech can be absolute. Because we
live in communities, the exercise of freedom of the press, like freedom of
speech and religion, must be compatible with the preservation of other
rights essential to democracy and the pursuit of human fulfillment. Jus-
tice Frankfurter was correct when he wrote that the demands of the First
37. Id. at 106.
38. See U.S. CONsT. amends. III, IV, IX, XIV.
39. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
40. It is logical to conclude that inhibition of newsgathering is related to the risk of harm
assumed by sources. Of course sources face risks, such as exposure through extra-legal means,
that a shield law cannot mitigate. Shield laws that explicitly consider harm to the source,
however, will lower the risk. In order to provide maximum protection of the public's interest
in receiving important international news, explicit consideration of source harm should be a
part of the federal shield statute.
Amendment freedoms, as well as the competing claims of governmental
authority to secure other recognized interests, are "better served by can-
did and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the con-
fines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for
the non-Euclidian problems to be solved."41 Justice Holmes' famous ex-
ample of the man falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theater is the most
obvious example of speech that can be controlled.42 These controls on
this most essential liberty are necessary if we view first amendment free-
doms not as ends in themselves, but as the means to a free society and
individual fulfillment.
Although some balancing needs to be done, it is dangerous to as-
sume that the balance should be struck between private rights and public
rights. The weights assigned to public and private rights cannot be equal
if we accept the premise that democracy exists for the fulfillment of the
individuals' potentialities. If this premise be accepted, then only when
private rights compete against other private rights or public rights com-
pete against public rights is balancing appropriate. Therefore, public
rights like the rights to free speech and a free press are superior to all
private rights, except, necessarily, the right to life itself.
The Privilege Statute we propose is premised on the assumptions
that an open marketplace of ideas will lead to increased knowledge and
that increased knowledge serves the welfare of the individual and the
society. The First Amendment was ratified in order to disable ephemeral
majorities from hurting themselves and their heirs by cutting off the
means to search for the truth-free speech and a free press.4 3
Under the marketplace of ideas theory, no special prominence nor
protection need be given to speech related to public or political matters
because the marketplace, the individual, decides not only the truth of the
ideas, but their importance.' The marketplace of ideas is a valuable tool
for individual development. This development, rather than public partic-
ipation in self-government, is the transcendent good that militates for an
absolute privilege for reporters.
41. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
43. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 46
(1985).
44. See Leading Cases: Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech, Press and Association:
Restrictions on Prisoners' Rights to Receive Publications, 103 HARv. L. REv. 239 (1989); but
see Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 243, which
argues that the marketplace of ideas theory is bankrupt because markets can be bought by
advertising and the like.
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The issue, then, is who makes the rules about what can and cannot
be said in a society in which the people are taken to be sovereign. If one
believes that it is the individual and not the majority who should decide
in what and in whom to trust, then the individual's attainment of knowl-
edge transcends the value of popular decision-making, and it follows that
speech is more important than the other values underpinning the struc-
ture of popular decision-making. Preventing the people from banning
"Carnal Knowledge" 45 or forcing the disclosure of the identities of mem-
bers of dissident groups cannot be done in the name of democracy per se.
It must be done in the name of the individual. Speech is protected by the
Constitution precisely because the individual is the arbiter of ideas.46
Speech, wrote Thomas Mann, is civilization itself.47 Free civiliza-
tions and democratic government rely upon and require the exercise of
well-informed and sensible opinions by the great bulk of the citizens.
The people in turn rely on the free institutional press for much of the
information with which to form those opinions.
H. History
Conflict over disclosure of confidential information has existed since
colonial times.48 In 1722, James Franklin, a publisher, and his appren-
tice brother Benjamin were brought before the assembly to answer ques-
tions about an article that allegedly libeled the government.49 Because
the elder Franklin refused to reveal the source of the article, he was jailed
for one month.5" A New York journalist was jailed for nine months in
1734 after refusing to reveal the sources of a story that was uncompli-
mentary toward the colonial governor.51 In 1848, a reporter for the New
York Herald was held in contempt for refusing to answer questions at a
secret Senate proceeding about the source of a confidential document
45. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
46. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 47-72 (1982); see also
Ingeber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
47. THOMAS MANN, THE BUDDENBROOKS (1984).
48. See Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234-35 (1974).
Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina presents a stimulating historical and political analy-
sis of the reporter's privilege. Senator Ervin introduced S. 1128, one of several bills addressing
the reporter's privilege during the 92nd and 93rd Congressional Sessions. Id. at 256, 261, 269.
49. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 229 n.l
(1971) (citing B. FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 69 (1964)).
50. Id.
51. Note, Disclosure of Confidential Sources in International Reporting, 60 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1631, 1639 n.52 (1987).
containing the treaty marking the end of the Mexican-American War.
52
The Georgia Supreme Court, in 1887, held that if a newspaper publisher
did not reveal the author of a libelous article, he would be considered the
author and, in addition, punished for contempt.53 A New York American
reporter, who in 1935 declined to give grand jury testimony concerning
the names of persons and places on which a gambling article was based,
unsuccessfully claimed the communications were privileged.' The re-
porter was held in contempt and jailed.55 Although the press-govern-
ment conflict over disclosure continues into modem times, until the
1960s the issue received little attention.
56
Increased attention to the reporter's privilege issue in the 1960s and
1970s was a direct result of the huge increase in press subpoenas during
that time.57 This tremendous growth in press subpoenas is attributable
to several factors. First, institutional dissatisfaction and opposition to
the Vietnam War found expression through various dissident groups.
58
Reporting about these groups was made possible through confidentiality
guarantees given by reporters to their sources.59 Second, government in-
vestigation of radical activity collided with these confidentiality guaran-
tees,' and police were often not willing to negotiate with the press over
52. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848) (No. 10,375); see also Monk, Evi-
dentiary Privilege for Journalists'Sources Theory and Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REV. 1,
18 (1986).
53. Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887).
54. In re Mooney, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). The Mooney court refused to
extend a common law testimonial privilege to confidential communications between a reporter
and source, noting the agreement of "every state which has passed on the subject." Id. at 291,
199 N.E. at 415.
55. Id.
56. Ervin, supra note 48, at 241. In 1934, the American Newspaper Guild adopted a
canon in its Code of Ethics that required reporters to "refuse to reveal confidences or disclose
sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investigatory bodies."
Geraghty & Raphael, Reporter's Privilege and Juvenile Anonymity: Two Confidentiality Policies
on a Collision Course, 16 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 43, 51 n.47 (1984) (quoting J. BARRON & C.
DiENEs, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PREss 414 (1979)). Courts have, however,
refused to rank this ethical obligation above evidentiary needs. See D'Alemberte, Journalists
Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 307,
315-16 (1969). Until 1972, the reporter's privilege issue did not receive serious attention from
the national legislature. See Ervin, supra note 48, at 241.
57. See Geraghty & Raphael, supra note 56, at 51 n.47; Ervin, supra note 48, at 241-46;
Note, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg" The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24
UCLA L. REv. 160, 162 n.13 (1976).
58. Ervin, supra note 48, at 244.
59. Newsmen's Pivilege: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 645 (1973).
60. See Suhrheinrich, Newsperson's Privilege: An Extra-Constitutional Right, 4 DET. C.L.
R v. 1013, 1014-17 (1986) (recounting incident in which confidential information held by a
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disclosure of confidential sources.61 Finally, investigative reporting was
reborn as a reaction to secrecy and perceived manipulation of the press
by the Nixon Administration.62 Thus, the 1960s heralded a change in
the press-government relationship from accommodating and cooperative
to adversarial.
A great deal of judicial activity was generated by the press-govern-
ment confidential source clash in the 1960s. 63 Following longstanding
precedent, the courts consistently refused to recognize a common law
privilege shielding journalists from disclosing confidential information.
6
This refusal was based on the presumption against the creation of privi-
leges.65 As stated by John Henry Wigmore in his renowned treatise on
Evidence, "No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against
demand for the truth in a court of justice.
66
According to Professor Wigmore, a communication must meet four
fundamental conditions in order to warrant a nondisclosure privilege:
61. M. CULLEN, MASS MEDIA & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 212 (1981); see also text ac-
companying notes 92-98 infra.
62. See Ervin, supra note 48, at 246-50; Blasi, supra note 49, at 234 (1971).
63. See Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (magazine writer unsuccess-
fully asserted reporter's privilege and was ordered to answer deposition questions about source
of an article concerning a professional baseball player); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D.
439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 901 (1970) (reporter compelled to answer oral
interrogatory as to source of story about marijuana use by children of elected officials, despite
claim of constitutional and common law privilege); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 315 F.
Supp. 681 (Md. 1970) (no constitutional privilege recognized when newspaper published pro-
posed indictments sealed by the court); In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472
(1961) (daily newspaper reporter ordered to divulge confidential source of information con-
cerning firing of personnel director of Civil Service Commission); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193
A.2d 181 (1963) (contempt order against manager and city editor who refused to produce
information used in articles on government corruption vacated); Beecroft v. Point Pleasant
Print & Publishing Co., 82 NJ. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964) (defendant newspaper in libel
action based on allegedly defamatory editorial ordered to disclose source because statutory
privilege waived); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
905 (1968) (student newspaper reporter held in contempt for refusing to disclose identities of
persons interviewed for story concerning marijuana use on campus); State v. Sheridan, 248
Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18 (1967) (construing shield law statute for the first time since its enact-
ment in 1896, appellate court dismissed as moot an appeal from circuit court order sustaining
privilege claim).
64. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236,
238 (9th Cir. 1975); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291,291-92, 199 N.E. 415,415-
16 (1936). But see Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing federal
common law privilege); United States v. Lopez, No. 86 CR 513, Lexis 11095 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(adopting federal common law privilege against compelled disclosure of a reporter's work
product); Note, supra note 57, at 161 n.9 (1976) (referencing unreported cases allowing the
privilege).
65. United States v. Bryan, 399 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
66. J. WIGMORE, supra note 65, § 2286.
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1) The communication must originate in a confidence that it
will not be disclosed;
2) Confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties;
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity must be sedulously fostered; and
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclo-
sure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.67
Arguments that a reporter's confidential communications do not merit
protection under Wigmore's criteria focus on the fourth requirement and
posit that there is no conclusive evidence that, without a privilege, inves-
tigative reporting would be hampered.6" At least one commentator has
pointed out that the establishment of existing common law testimonial
privileges has been based on conclusions about harm to privileged rela-
tionships that are founded on speculation about human behavior, not on
hard evidence.69 Vincent Blasi's empirical study, however, revealed that
experienced reporters rely on confidential sources for twenty-five percent
of their stories.70 The average member of the population Blasi sur-
veyed71 reported reliance on confidential sources from 22.2 percent to
34.4 percent of the time.72 Government reporters depended on regular
confidential sources in 28.5 percent of their stories.73 Reliance on confi-
dential sources was also high in police, financial, trial, minority, and radi-
cal group reporting.74 In addition to showing that confidential sources
are an important facet of news dissemination, Blasi demonstrated that
67. Id § 2285.
68. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91; Monk, supra note 52, at 9 (1986).
69. Monk, supra note 52, at 51; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
70. Blasi, supra note 49, at 248.
71. Id. at 235-39. Blasi's study consisted of three components. First, 47 reporters and
editors were personally interviewed. The interviewees were chosen on the basis of (1) ex-
pressed willingness to cooperate, (2) achievements in the profession, (3) the kind of reporting
or editing engaged in, (4) prominence, and (5) familiarity with the subpoena problem. Sec-
ond, a qualitative questionnaire was mailed to 67 reporters believed to be especially familiar
with the subpoena problem. Third, quantitative questionnaires were mailed to reporters from
208 newspapers with a minimum circulation of 50,000, and to editors of 95 underground news-
papers. The return rate for the quantitative questionnaires was 66%. Blasi acknowledges the
non-random selection of his population and the possibility of bias. He contends, however, that
the study's findings are useful because the respondents provide a significant portion of news to
the public.
72. Id. at 247.
73. Id. at 251.
74. Id.
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important sources have been lost due to the fear of being revealed.
Thus, the community has a great interest in fostering relationships
between reporters and confidential sources. Given the primary position
of the First Amendment, this interest is even greater than the interest in
the fair administration ofjustice. Despite convincing arguments support-
ing common law recognition of a reporter's privilege, however, the judi-
cial branch has not reversed its position.
First amendment protection for a reporter's confidentiality promises
was first claimed in Garland v. Torre,76 in which the Second Circuit ac-
cepted the "hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a journalist's confi-
dential sources of information may entail an abridgment of press freedom
by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news."177 However,
the court subordinated these first amendment values to the "paramount
public interest in the fair administration of justice.173 Because the iden-
tity of the confidential source was material, relevant, and "went to the
heart of the plaintiffs claim," the reporter was ordered to disclose her
source.79 The first and only time"0 the full Supreme Court addressed the
reporter's privilege issue was in 1972, when it decided Branzburg v.
Hayes."1 In a five to four decision, the Court held that the First Amend-
ment did not release journalists from the obligation to give grand jury
testimony implicating confidential sources.8 2 Writing for the majority,
Justice White recognized that, while newsgathering is a protected activity
under the First Amendment,83 this protection is subject to restraints in-
75. Id. at 262-74. For example, Blasi describes the "paradigm" example of Anthony Rip-
ley, a Times Detroit reporter assigned to cover an SDS national convention in East Lansing,
Michigan. After covering the convention, which he was allowed to attend in exchange for a
confidentiality guarantee, Ripley was subpoenaed by and appeared before the House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) to answer questions about the convention. Several
months later, a radical source refused an interview with Ripley, whom he called the "fink who
testified before the HUAC." See also Note, Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 20, 43-44 (1969).
76. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
77. Id. at 548.
78. Id at 549.
79. Id at 550.
80. Langley and Levine, Branzburg Revisited- Confidential Sources and First Amendment
Values, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 13, 13 (1988).
81. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
82. Id at 667.
83. Id at 681. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the
Supreme Court recognized the right to gather information, noting that" 'without some protec-
tion for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 448 U.S. at 576
(quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681). In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens declared Rich-
mond Newspapers a watershed case, because the Court had "never before.., squarely held that
the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever."
Id at 582.
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cluding the reporter's duty to appear before a grand jury and answer
questions relevant to criminal investigations.84 Justice White gave more
weight to the public interest in law enforcement and effective grand jury
proceedings than to the "uncertaino burden on news gathering... said
to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to rele-
vant questions ... in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or
criminal trial." 85
Branzburg has been subject to varying interpretations, ranging from
the determination that neither an absolute or qualified reporter's privi-
lege survived Branzburg86 to the ruling that the majority and concurring
opinions in Branzburg "recognize a privilege which protects information
given in confidence to a reporter."87 Thus, the degree of constitutional
84. 408 U.S. at 685.
85. Id. at 690-91. Justice White further disparaged the qualified privilege claimed by the
petitioner, reasoning that the unpredictability that would flow from such a privilege would
deter confidential sources. According to Justice White, "if confidential sources are as sensitive
as they are claimed to be.... only an absolute privilege would suffice." 408 U.S. at 702.
86. Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 297, 562 P.2d 791, 797, cert. denied,
430 U.S. 930 (1977) ("[O]ur reading of Branzburg v. Hayes... is to the effect that no news-
man's privilege against disclosure of confidential sources founded on the First Amendment
exists in an absolute or qualified version."); see also United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208,
215 (D.C. 1972) (First Amendment does not extend to a reporter the privilege to refuse to
disclose confidential information subpoenaed by defendant in a criminal trial); Hurst v. State,
160 Ga. App. 830, 832, 287 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1982) (Branzburg requires subordination of First
Amendment to criminal defendant's right to compulsory process); Lewis v. United States, 501
F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975) (Branzburg teaches that re-
porter's need to keep sources and information confidential may not override the authority of a
grand jury); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (Branzburg
declined to recognize either an absolute or qualified reporter's privilege); The Lexington Her-
ald-Leader Co. v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374, 378-79 (Ky. 1984) (same); Gagnon v. District Court,
632 P.2d 567, 569 n.2 (Colo. 1981) (Branzburg refused to create a reporter's privilege); In re
Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 267, 394 A.2d 330, 334, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (Branzburg
forecloses first amendment protection of confidential information when a criminal defendant
enforces his sixth amendment rights); Georgia Communications Corp. v. Home, 164 Ga. App.
227, 228, 294 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1982) (reading Branzburg to find no constitutional basis for a
reporter's testimonial privilege in any context, including defamation).
Courts that read Branzburg as foreclosing a reporter's testimonial privilege quote the fol-
lowing language from Justice White's majority opinion:
Until now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses that is rooted in the
federal Constitution is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. We are asked to create another by interpreting the First Amendment to
grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we de-
cline to do.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972).
87. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Farr v.
Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975) ("It is clear that Branzburg recognizes some First
Amendment protection of news sources. The language of the case likewise indicates that the
privilege is a limited or conditional one."); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Branzburg court indicated a "qualified privilege would be available in some circumstances
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protection available for a reporter's confidential sources remains
uncertain.
The Branzburg majority opinion expressly invited the federal and
state legislatures to create reporter's shield laws, emphasizing that mak-
ing value judgments concerning the importance of enforcing criminal
laws was a legislative function."8 Seventeen states had reporter's shield
laws when Branzburg was decided. 9 Nine additional states enacted
shield laws after Branzburg.90
Congressional reaction to Branzburg was quick and intensive. On
the day following the decision, Senator Alan Cranston of California in-
troduced a bill that would have extended an absolute privilege to report-
even where a reporter is called before a grand jury to testify"); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980) (a conditional privilege is consistent with
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, necessary to make a majority in Branzburg); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981) (Branzburg created a qualified first amendment privilege); Mitchell v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 268, 276-77, 690 P.2d 625, 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157 (1984) (Branzburg does not
preclude recognition of a qualified privilege); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morejon, 529
So. 2d 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (Florida Supreme Court has held, based on Branzburg,
that reporters have a qualified privilege).
Courts that believe a qualified privilege survived Branzburg v. Hayes have relied on Justice
Powell's concurring opinion, which clarified that "It]he Court does not hold that newsmen,
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the
gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J.,
concurring). See, ag., Bruno & Stiliman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st
Cir. 1980).
88. 408 U.S. at 706. Justice White opined that
[a]t the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory news-
man's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as nar-
row or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally
important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate.
Id.
89. 408 U.S. at 689 n.27. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1988); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 09.25.150-220 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-917 (1987 Supp.); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1989); IND. CODE 34-3-5-1
(1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-100 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1454 (West
Supp. 1988); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 767.5a
(Callaghan 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24A.84A-21 to 21.13 (West 1988); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1989); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .11-.12 (Anderson 1981); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon
1982).
90. See Geraghty & Raphael, supra note 56, at 51 n.48. Statutes enacted after Branzburg
include DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-901 to
909 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to
20-147 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 31-01 to 06.2 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 25.06
(West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 1-3
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1988).
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ers.91 Twenty-eight reporter's privilege bills were introduced during the
92nd Congress.92 At least twenty-four bills were introduced in 1973,
when the 93rd Congress convened.93 Despite the number of reporter's
privilege bills which were introduced, Congress failed to enact legisla-
tion.94 Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., of South Carolina who presided over sub-
committee hearings concerning the reporter's privilege, suggests four
reasons for congressional inaction. First, press support for privilege leg-
islation subsided when it appeared that an absolute privilege was politi-
cally impossible.95 The press believed that qualification of the privilege
would destroy predictability.9 6 Additionally, the press feared that pro-
tective legislation would lead to legislative regulation of the press.97 In
the words of columnist James J. Kilpatrick:
The Lord giveth, we are told, and the Lord taketh away. The stat-
ute that is passed is the statute that subsequently may be repealed.
If we of the press yield to temptation-if we ask and get a statutory
shield law, make such law our chief protection-we will find our-
selves mousetrapped one of these days. We ought not to rely upon
a statute which may prove as ephemeral as the winds.98
The second reason legislation was not enacted, according to Senator Er-
vin, was the willingness of courts to read Branzburg as conferring a quali-
fied reporter's privilege.9 9 Third, new restraint demonstrated by
prosecutors "served to muffle the hue and cry in Congress."1°" Fourth
and finally, according to Senator Ervin, activity surrounding the Water-
gate incident in 1973 and 1974 took congressional attention away from
the reporter's privilege controversy. 101
At least some of the self-imposed restraint by prosecutors and the
broad interpretation by lower courts of Branzburg are attributable to
congressional fervor over the reporter's privilege issue in 1972 and 1973.
The question remains whether the public's right to an unfettered press is
91. Ervin, supra note 48, at 255. Senator Cranston's bill would have provided an absolute
testimonial privilege for journalists. Id.
92. Newsmen's Privilege, supra note 59, at 76 (statement of Jack C. Landau and Fred P.
Graham, Members of the Executive Committee of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press).
93. Id.
94. Ervin, supra note 48, at 275.
95. Id. at 262.
96. Id. at 271.
97. Id.
98. Newsmen's Privilege, supra note 59, at 81 (statement of James J. Kilpatrick, columnist,
Washington Star Syndicate).
99. Ervin, supra note 48, at 273; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
100. Ervin, supra note 48, at 273-74.
101. Id. at 274-75.
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sufficiently protected by prosecutorial restraint and an unpredictable
qualified privilege.
M. The Diversity of Protection Provided by State Reporter's
Shield Laws
[I]f confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be,...
only an absolute privilege would suffice.'02
Many states have adopted the three-pronged Branzburg test 0 3 or
some modification. Twenty-six states"°4 have adopted by statute some
form of reporter's shield law. 105 The nature and the scope of the privi-
leges provided vary widely from state to state."°6
Twelve states protect a source's identity, but not the information
conveyed. 10 7 Those states base their laws on the rationale that unpub-
102. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
103. In arguing that the Court should adopt a qualified privilege for journalists faced with
subpoenas, Justice Stewart also stated a test for determining when such a qualified privilege
should be denied: the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that
the newsman [sic] has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding in-
terest in the information. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972).
104. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); AiAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150 - .220 (1987); Amu.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West 1988) and CAL. CONST. art I, § 2(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326
(1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-901 to 8-909 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1987), IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burnes 1986); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1454 (West 1982); MD. Crs. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-
112 (1987); MICH. Cmp. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-
.025 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-
21 to 21.13 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1984); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1986); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1980); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 44.510 - 44.540 (1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
105. For a detailed analysis of the language of the above statutes, see Monk, supra note 52,
at 26-34.
106. Some states have incorporated an absolute privilege into their constitutions. Califor-
nia amended its constitution to include a shield law provision in order to curb anti-shield law
decisions. See CAL. CoNSr. art I, § 2; see also Monk, supra note 52, at 45-47. Other states
have interpreted the United States Constitution as well as their own constitutions as providing
a qualified privilege. See, eg., Wright v. Kiss (In re Contempt of Wright), 108 Idaho 418, 706
P.2d 40 (1985).
107. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150 - .220 (1987) (no re-
porter may be compelled to disclose the source of information); Axuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
2237 (1982) (the source of information); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987) (the source of
information used); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burnes 1986) (the source of any information
procured); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) (the source of any informa-
lished news or information should not be protected. Courts in some of
these jurisdictions, however, have construed these laws to protect at least
information that might lead to disclosure of the source's identity."' 8 In
Arizona, the legislature enacted additional legislation that appears to
broaden the shield statute's scope to include information, as well as the
source, within its protection. 9 In thirteen states, statutes specifically
protect both the source and the information he or she conveys.110 Michi-
gan's statute is the most expansive of these. It provides that all commu-
nications between reporters of newspapers or other publications and their
informants are declared to be privileged and confidential.111
Traditionally, the law of privilege covers only communications in
situations where a confidential relationship exists. At common law, for a
confidential relationship to exist, four basic requirements had to be satis-
fied: (1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the par-
ties; (3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to
the relation by the disclosure must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the direct disposal of litigation.112 Nonetheless, of the twenty-
six state reporter's shield laws, only three expressly require proof of con-
fidentiality as a prerequisite to the newsperson's invocation of the privi-
tion procured); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451 50 1454 (West 1982) (the identity of any
informant or any source of information obtained); MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-
112(c)(7) (Supp. 1987) (the source of any news or information obtained); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Page 1981) (any information procured); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 4942 (Purdon 1982) (the source of any information procured); RI. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to
9-19.1-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
108. See, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 279 (3d Cir. 1980) (Penn-
sylvania shield law held to protect out-takes even though the identity of the source was
known).
109. See Monk, supra note 52, at 51 n.268. Monk points out that Arizona's shield statute,
which protects only the source of the information and not the information itself, appears to be
broader when read in conjunction with ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214(a)(1987), which
requires that six stringent criteria be met before a subpoena to compel disclosure will be issued.
110. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West
1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021 to .025 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to
26-1-903 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-
21 to 21.13 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1984); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 2506 (1980); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 44.510 to 44.540 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to 9-
19.1-3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
111. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982). The statute presumes that any rela-
tionship between reporter and source is confidential.
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lege."1 3 Delaware, one of the three states to require confidentiality as a
prerequisite to the invocation of the privilege, requires a statement, made
under oath, that an express or implied understanding of confidentiality
existed between the reporter and his source.11 4 Rhode Island, similarly,
places great emphasis on the confidential relationship by designating con-
fidential relationships or confidential information ' as alone within the
scope of the statute's protection. The Rhode Island statute further rein-
forces the confidentiality requirement by providing for the waiver of the
privilege when the information obtained is made public.11 6 In contrast,
while the statement of public policy preceding Minnesota's shield law
indicates that its purpose is to ensure and perpetuate the confidential re-
lationship between the news media and its sources,11 7 an explicit or im-
plied understanding of confidentiality is not a prerequisite to invoking
the statute's protection.
Of the twenty-six states with reporter's testimonial shield statutes,
seven specifically qualified the broad language of their statutes by adopt-
ing either the Branzburg test 1 " or some modification of that test. '19 The
Branzburg three-pronged test for denial of the privilege requires a show-
ing of the relevancy to a probable violation of law, the unavailability of
the information from alternative sources, and a compelling and overrid-
ing interest in the information.'20 The test or its modification is generally
applied when the subpoenaing party seeks to discover material that the
newsperson claims is protected by the privilege. It is then up to the dis-
cretion of the judge to determine whether the party seeking the informa-
tion has met its burden by making the requisite showing.'2 1
113. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1980); N.M. R. EvID. 524; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (1985).
114. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1980). No such understanding is required, however,
to evoke the privilege in non-adjudicative proceedings in the state. Id. § 4321.
115. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(a) (1985): "[N]o person shall be required... to reveal
confidential association, to disclose any confidential information or to disclose the source of
any confidential information received .... "
116. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9.19.1-3(a) (1985): "The privilege conferred by § 9-19.1-2 shall
not apply to any information which has at any time been published, broadcast, or otherwise
made public by the person claiming the privilege."
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West 1988).
118. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680 (1972).
119. See, e.g., ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214(A)(2), (4) (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 4323(a) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.024 (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-
21.3(b) (West 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506(B)(2) (1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(c)
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(c) (1980).
120. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680.
121. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(c) (1980).
A. Branzburg Test States
Four states, Delaware, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Tennessee, have
adopted the Branzburg three-pronged test. 122 Tennessee, for example, re-
quires a showing by clear and convincing evidence. Minnesota also re-
quires that the party seeking production demonstrate that the three
Branzburg criteria are satisfied. 123 New Jersey incorporates the three-
pronged Branzburg test and allows a newsperson's privilege to be over-
come by a showing by a preponderance of the evidence. 12 4 This weight-
ing was chosen by the New Jersey legislature because of its concern for
balancing first amendment and sixth amendment rights.1 25 The other
states use some modified form of the Branzburg test and limit the appli-
cation of the three-pronged test to adjudicative proceedings.1 26 The Del-
aware statute, however, provides an unqualified privilege to protect the
reporter from testifying as to his or her source, and only a qualified privi-
lege as to unpublished information. 127 Under this statute, the judge de-
termines whether the public interest in having the reporter's testimony
outweighs the public interest in keeping the information confidential. 28
In making the determination, the judge employs the Branzburg test, ex-
amining such factors as the relevance of the information, the efforts made
by the seeking party to obtain the information from other sources, and
the possible effect disclosure will have on the future flow of information
to the public. 129 Minnesota's statute is similar to the Delaware statute
except that it does not distinguish between sources and the information
itself.
B. Modified Branzburg Test States
Four states130 employ a modification of the Branzburg test. For ex-
ample, Oklahoma requires that the party seeking disclosure of the infor-
122. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-25 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.021-25 (West
Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21.13 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-20811 (1980).
123. The Minnesota statute does not distinguish between the sources and the information
itself. MWN. STAT. ANN. § 595.024 (West Supp. 1988).
124. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21.13 (West Supp. 1987).
125. Id.
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320-26 (1974). There is an unqualified privilege in non-
adjudicative proceedings. Id. § 4321.
127. Id. § 4323. "The privilege provided by § 4321 shall not prevent a reporter from being
required in an adjudicative proceeding to testify concerning the content, but not the source, of
the information that he obtained.. . ." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Arizona, Delaware, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island.
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mation or the source's identity establish by clear and convincing evidence
the relevance of the information to a significant issue of law and the use
of due diligence in seeking an alternative source of the information.131
Rhode Island employs a two-pronged test that requires the person seek-
ing the information or its source to establish the relevance of the infor-
mation to the prosecution of a specific felony or to "prevent a threat to
human life," as well as its unavailability from other witnesses.1 32 The
Arizona statute similarly requires the seeking party to provide affidavits
attesting to the relevance of the information sought to the action and the
exhaustion of alternative sources.
133
C. Near-Absolute and Absolute Privilege States
Eleven states have enacted reporter's shield laws granting newsper-
sons' sources and unpublished information absolute or nearly-absolute
confidentiality.1 34 In these states' statutes there is neither qualifying lan-
guage as to confidentiality, nor a test as to when disclosure of either re-
porter's sources or information is required. The Nevada shield law, for
example, provides:
No reporter... of any newspaper ... radio or television station
may be required to disclose any published or unpublished informa-
tion obtained or prepared by such person in such person's profes-
sional capacity in gathering, receiving, or processing information
for communication to the public, or the source of any information
procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceedings,
trial, or investigation ....
The statute provides for this privilege to be accorded in such proceedings
as trials, grand jury investigations, legislative or committee investigations
or hearings, or department, agency, or commission proceedings.
136
Because the language of the Nevada statute is specific and absolute,
it is more predictable and broad in its application than, for example, the
131. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(B)(2) (West 1980).
132. RI. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(c) (1985).
133. A ,z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214(A)(2) (Supp. 1987).
134. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1988); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1977); IND.
CODE § 34-3-5-1 (1988); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Bobbs-Merrill 1988) (absolute as to
confidential sources, qualified concerning information obtained from confidential sources);
MD. Cs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112(c) (1988); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-901 (1987);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-146 (1987); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21.13 (West 1988); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney
1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04, .11-.12 (Anderson 1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5942 (Purdon 1982).




Delaware and Minnesota statutes.137 The Delaware statute grants re-
porters an absolute privilege against mandatory disclosure of information
or of the identity of source in non-adjudicative proceedings. 3 ' The
meaning of "non-adjudicative" proceedings, however, is ambiguous. For
example, it is unclear whether Delaware characterizes grand jury pro-
ceedings as adjudicative. 13 9 Only if grand juries were treated as non-ad-
judicative proceedings would there truly be an absolute privilege. The
ambiguity of the Delaware statute makes it less predictable and thus less
effective than the Nevada statute.
The wide spectrum of statutory protections afforded the institu-
tional press do the individual and the community a disservice." Local,
national, and international information is necessary for the individual
and the society to make educated choices. Clear and absolute reporter's
shield statutes are undermined by the presence of other vague and condi-
tional statutes; although a reporter's source might be protected by Michi-
gan law, the source's identity might be unprotected in Minnesota. It is
entirely likely that the party seeking disclosure by a national news organ
would shop for the forum with the least protective reporter's shield law.
Thus the protection afforded our news media may well be only as strong
as the weakest of state reporter's shield laws.
Empirical studies concerning reporters' confidential communica-
tions support the conclusion that some important information will not
become news without a predictable reporter's privilege. 4' This informa-
tion is vital to the primary first amendment value-self-fulfillment-and
to the primary societal means to that end-self-governance. 142 While the
correct disposition of litigation is an important goal, failure to fully meet
this goal would not severely undermine our ability to self-govern. It is
therefore necessary to eliminate the diversity of standards and privileges
afforded the newsperson and offer national absolute protection to the lo-
cal, national, and international news media.
137. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-25 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-25 (West
Supp. 1988).
138. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4321 (1980).
139. Id.
140. See Newsmen's Privilege, supra note 59, at 249-52 (statement of Robert G. Fichenberg
Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Ex-
ecutive Editor, The Knickerbocker News-Union Star).
141. Blasi, supra note 49, at 270.
142. See Newsmen's Privilege, supra note 59, at 249-52 (statement of Robert G.
Fichenberg).
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IV. Proposed Model Statute: Reporter's Testimonial Privilege
See. 1. Purpose. The purpose of this statute is to protect the constitu-
tional right of freedom of speech by encouraging the free and vigorous
gathering of information by reporters so that the public can be fully
informed.
Sec. 2. Definitions. For the purposes of this statute:
(a) "reporter" means a person who is or, at the time the information in
issue was obtained, was employed by or connected with the institutional
press for the purpose of gathering or editing news;
(b) "institutional press" means any pamphlet or newspaper, radio sta-
tion, television station, press association, news agency, or wire service
with a general circulation, regardless of its size, regularly engaged in the
gathering and disseminating of news and information to the public;
(c) "federal or state proceeding" means any proceeding or investigation
before any federal or state judicial, legislative, executive, or administra-
tive body.
Sec. 3. Privileged communication. Except as provided in section 5, no
reporter shall be required to disclose in any federal or state proceeding:
(a) the source of any published or unpublished information obtained in
the course of his or her employment or connection with the institutional
press; or
(b) any unpublished information obtained or prepared in the course of
his or her employment or connection with the institutional press.
Sec. 4. Criminal defendants. If, based on a showing by a criminal de-
fendant, the judge finds that it is more likely than not that a reporter's
testimony, privileged under section 3, is necessary to the fair determina-
tion of guilt or innocence, the judge, on motion of the criminal defend-
ant, shall dismiss the charges to which the testimony would relate.
Sec. 5. Evidence Necessary to the Prosecution. If, based on evidence in
the case or from other showing by the prosecution, the judge determines
that it is more likely than not that a reporter's testimony, privileged
under section 3, is necessary to the conviction of a criminal defendant
who, if not confined, is likely to directly cause death or personal injury,
the reporter shall be compelled to testify. This exception to the absolute
privilege set forth in section 3 is to be interpreted narrowly and applied
only when the threatened danger is both serious and imminent.
V. Nature of Privilege
The model statute proposes an absolute privilege, except in the
grand jury or criminal trial context when confidential information held
by a reporter is necessary to the indictment or prosecution of a person
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who, if guilty of the crime charged, is likely to cause the death or serious
bodily injury of another person upon release from custody. 4 3 An abso-
lute privilege, rather than a qualified privilege, is necessary to effectively
promote the purpose for a reporter's privilege: protection of the free flow
of information between the media and their sources.'" This free flow of
information promotes individual fulfillment by providing resources nec-
essary to a well-informed public.' 45
Central to the effectiveness of a reporter's privilege is outcome pre-
dictability.'1 Unless sources can predict that their identities will be pro-
tected under the law, they will be unwilling to risk communications with
reporters. A qualified privilege, no matter how structured, requires bal-
ancing of interests at the point the privilege is asserted. 4 7 Because even
lawyers are unable to predict accurately the outcome of judicial balanc-
ing efforts, it is unlikely that sources who need confidentiality will feel
secure enough to come forward.148 Only an absolute privilege is capable
of the predictability essential to the effective protection of
newsgathering. 4 9
Speaking in hearings before the 93rd Congress with regard to quali-
fied reporters' privileges enacted in numerous states, reporter Fred Gra-
ham of CBS News noted:
It has seemed to us that where there are exceptions, the exception
tends to swallow the rule. Where there is an exception to the privi-
143. The exception to the absolute privilege is discussed infra notes 178-190 and accompa-
nying text. This discussion includes definition of the exception, justifications for the exception,
and consideration of the effect of the exception on the outcome predictability of the privilege
created by the model statute.
144. Sprague v. Walter, 518 Pa. 425, 435, 543 A.2d 1078, 1082 (1988) ("strong societal
purpose in fostering uninhibited disclosure between individuals and the media"); see also
D'Alemberte, supra note 56, at 317; Monk, supra note 52, at 10.
145. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Effective
self-government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unim-
peded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected to
critique, rebuttal and re-examination.").
146. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 702. In his majority opinion, Justice White criticized the con-
ditional privilege asserted by the plaintiffs:
If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be, the pros-
pect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation justifies it is
hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem. For them, it would appear that only an
absolute privilege will suffice.
Id. (Citations omitted).
147. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential
Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 340-42 (1970).
148. Id. at 341; see also Newsmen's Privilege, supra note 59, at 48-49 (testimony of Senator
Alan Cranston arguing that potential informers will be deterred from talking to the press
unless the law is broad and simple to understand).
149. See Note, supra note 10, at 630; Monk, supra note 52, at 62.
Summer 19911
804 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:779
leges, judges have proved ingenious in finding that in any particu-
lar case the privilege doesn't apply because of some qualification.
And it boggles the nonlegal brain, some of the cases that don't fall
in the privilege. But judges quite often are able to do that so we
feel if you have an absolute privilege, then there is no question. If
the source believes that his identity is not going to be disclosed, he
will help disseminate information to the press, but he is not going
to study the language of these qualifications. If he hears a judge
can say the privilege doesn't apply in some instances, he is going to
be shy.1 50
The choice presented to lawmakers is an absolute privilege or an ineffec-
tive privilege. In fight of the paramount interest in preserving self-gov-
ernance, the better alternative is the absolute privilege reflected in the
model statute.
VI. The Privilege Holder
Under the model statute, only persons who are or, at the time the
information in issue was obtained, were employed by or connected with
the institutional press can invoke the privilege. This narrow definition of
persons entitled to claim the absolute reporter's privilege is necessary to
protect the public interest in fair and effective justice, which must be
balanced against interests served by a reporter's privilege.15 1 Extending
the protection of an absolute privilege beyond the institutional press
would create an unacceptable level of interference with the administra-
tion of fair and effective justice.15 2
Justice White, in his majority opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, stated
that defining the parameters of a reporter's privilege "would present
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order." ' 3 In reference to
the holder of the privilege, he stated:
Sooner or later it would be necessary to define those categories of
newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure
in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the
right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeo-
graph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who
150. Newsmen's Privilege, supra note 59, at 62 (statement of Fred Graham, on behalf of
The Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press).
151. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (the administration of justice, a
fundamental function of government, is hindered by testimonial privileges); Bulow by Auer-
sperg v. Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987) (testimonial
privileges are not favored because "they contravene a fundamental principle of our jurispru-
dence that 'the public has a right to every man's evidence.'" (quoting United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))).
152. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690.
153. Id. at 703-04.
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utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.154
There is no question that freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment
apply to the lonely pamphleteer as well as to large metropolitan newspa-
pers. If the scholar or lonely pamphleteer meets the definition of institu-
tional press, he or she too would be protected for his or her efforts to
keep the public informed. 155 The public's interest in maintaining a vigor-
ous, aggressive, and independent press capable of participating in robust
unfettered debate over controversial matters is paramount.1 56 An abso-
lute privilege, however, interferes with the fair administration of jus-
tice. 157 For example, a libel suit may be lost because a reporter is not
required to disclose a source necessary to the plaintiff's case; 158 criminals
may go free because a reporter withholds incriminating evidence.159 The
importance of justice in our society is so weighty as to justify an absolute
reporter's privilege only when self-governance by the public is seriously
threatened. Restriction of information available to and disseminated by
the institutional press presents a threat of this magnitude. In order to
justify the obstacle to administration of justice caused by an absolute tes-
timonial privilege, a limit must exist on who may invoke the privilege.
Of the twenty-six states that have enacted a reporter's privilege, only six
allow persons employed by or connected with the institutional press to
invoke the privilege."6 In all but two of these states,' the reporter's
privilege is absolute. Of the fourteen states that extend the class of per-
154. Id. at 704.
155. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980)
("As a practical matter, however, the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief benefici-
ary of a right of access because it serves as the "agent" of interested citizens, and funnels
information about trials to a large number of individuals.").
156. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)
(stating the First Amendment was primarily designed to protect public self-governance); Baker
v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2nd Cir. 1972).
157. Monk, supra note 52, at 10 n.43 (theorizing that an absolute privilege would create "at
least isolated instances in which correct disposal of the immediate litigation will be
sacrificed").
158. See, eg., Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable Inc., 780 F.2d 340 (3d
Cir. 1985) (motion to compel discovery denied under Pennsylvania shield law; defendant
broadcast company's motion for summary judgment granted).
159. See, e.g., Suhrheinrich, supra note 60, at 1016-17 (discussing In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings: Storer Communications, Inc., No. 86-1787 (E.D. Mich. filed Sept. 9, 1986), affid, 810
F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987) and reflecting that an armed murderer's freedom to cause additional
harm was "a tremendous price to pay" for a reporter's privilege).
160. ALA. CODE. § 12-21-142 (1988); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1977); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421-100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, .11-
.12 (Anderson 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1988).
161. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (disclosure of a
source cannot be compelled, but disclosure of information can be compelled); TENN CODE
ANN. § 24-1-208 (1988).
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sons who can claim the privilege to those connected with or employed by
magazines,162 only five provide an absolute privilege.163 Six other states
have broadly defined the class of persons who can invoke the reporter's
privilege, 164 and only two of these create an absolute privilege.1 65 This
demonstrates the recognition by state legislatures that in order to prop-
erly balance an absolute reporter's privilege against the fair administra-
tion of justice, the class of persons eligible to claim the privilege must be
well-defined, as in our proposed statute.
VII. The Scope of the Privilege
The Supreme Court stated in Roth v. United States166 that the First
Amendment fosters unfettered interchange of ideas, and the press plays a
constitutionally prescribed role in that interchange.167 To provide for
that free exchange of ideas, an absolute privilege against forced disclo-
sure of the identities of confidential sources and unpublished information
gathered for news dissemination must exist.
The model statute proposes that all unpublished information and
the identity of any sources be privileged. The mere perception, whether
or not substantiated, that the government exerts control over the news
media through subpoenas and the like necessitates adoption of a uniform
federal shield statute. The public relies on the press to act as its major
source of surveillance of the government-the role of the proverbial
"watchdog." If it appears that the press cannot perform its watchdog
function, the public may lose confidence in their own ability peacefully to
162. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-901 to 909 (1985); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-54 (West 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 903 (1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie
1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21.13 (West 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7
(1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506
(West 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to
1.3 (1985).
163. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 903
(1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to
21.13 (West Supp. 1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982).
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a
(West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-025 (West 1988); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to
147 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510 (1988). As an
example of the broad coverage extended by these statutes, the Delaware reporters' privilege
can be invoked by journalists, scholars, educators, polemicists, or others who earn their liveli-
hood by disseminated words, sounds, or images.
165. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1988); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 147
(1987).
166. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
167. Id at 484.
prevent government usurpation of their rights. This erosion of confi-
dence could lessen the legitimacy of the government and threaten the
premise that peaceful change can be accomplished through the exercise
of democracy.
Most statutory privileges protect only the source's identity and in-
formation that might reveal the source's identity.16 Such protection is
unpredictable because the court must determine what information might
tend to reveal a source's identity. Therefore, in order for the privilege to
be predictable and effective, it must cover all unpublished information as
well as the identity of the source. A privilege that is absolute, given to all
members of the institutional news media, but of undefined scope remains
unpredictable. Consequently, the efficacy of such a privilege is negligible.
Many courts have attempted to provide adequate protection using
variants of the standards suggested by Justice Powell in his Branzburg
concurrence. 169 In Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.,17° a
series of articles had been published that criticized the quality of con-
struction of boats built by Bruno & Stillman. At deposition, the reporter
refused to disclose the identities of three sources who had been promised
confidentiality. The Globe court applied a number of standards, based on
Justice Powell's opinion in Branzburg, including the following:
(1) the party seeking disclosure must establish the relevance of the
information;
(2) the reporter must show the need for preserving confidentiality;
(3) the party seeking disclosure must prove that it is not using the
request as a pretense for "discovery by fishing expedition";
(4) the court must determine the need for confidentiality; and
(5) if the court is in doubt, it may make an in camera inspection of
the reporter's notes and, if still in doubt, may require that noncon-
fidential sources be exhausted before disclosure is compelled.
171
The new standard formulated in Globe is now commonplace. The
second Globe criterion, requiring consideration of the First Amendment,
makes explicit what is merely implicit in the balancing test advocated by
Justice Stewart in Branzburg. Because first amendment interests are crit-
ical to the balancing approach, it is proper that these interests be explic-
itly reflected in any balancing. The First Amendment is weakened,
however, if the confidentiality of the information or identity is dependent
upon the value judgment of an unknown judge or jury. The determina-
tion of relevance necessarily calls for a subjective determination by the
168. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 279 (3d Cir. 1980).
169. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
170. 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980).
171. Id. at 597-98.
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judge. The second requirement places the burden on the reporter to
prove the need for confidentiality, thus putting the reporter's judgment
and service relationships before the judge for approval. The third re-
quirement, the plaintiff's demonstration that he or she is not merely on a
fishing expedition, is subjective. Finally, both the court's determination
of the need for the confidential information and its in camera review are
subjective processes, unpredictable and thus destructive of the trust
needed by the confidential source when revealing information to a
reporter.
Such criteria can easily be abused for the purpose of exposure or
harassment." 2 Such abuses must be made nearly impossible. The indi-
vidual motives of anonymous informants are irrelevant to the constitu-
tional interest in maximizing the flow of information to the public. The
mere possibility of forced disclosure of the source's identity or confiden-
tial information is similar to a prior restraint in that it precludes the dis-
semination of information that the public might find newsworthy."' 3
Common experience suggests that the specter of search warrants is
likely to be more threatening to potential confidential sources than the
isolated attempts to compel disclosure described above."7 4 "Warrants
... will almost always result... in unannounced searches."1 75 Once
confidential materials are in the control of the police, the judge, or the
grand jury, a reporter's willingness to advocate freedom of speech and of
the press has no practical significance.' 76 As Justice Stewart noted in his
Branzburg dissent, when a grand jury exercises unbridled subpoena
power the sources knowledgeable of sensitive matters are afraid to dis-
close information, and newspeople cease to be both useful grand jury wit-
nesses and useful reporters and investigators of important public
issues. 177
The dispute over disclosure between the press and a private litigant
is substantially different from the dispute between the press and the gov-
ernment. The latter dispute more strongly demands a nearly absolute
172. See In re Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 411 N.E.2d 466 (1980).
173. See Note, supra note 10, at 620. The author advocates that courts recognize an abso-
lute privilege against forced disclosure of the identities of confidential sources.
174. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
175. Eckhardt & McKey, The Reporter's Privilege: An Update, 19 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. &
ALLIED FIELD L.Q. 109, 123 (1980).
176. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The majority in Branzburg as-
serted that subpoenaed reporters will be sufficiently protected by traditional limitations of the
grand jury and that even a qualified privilege would unduly interfere with the grand jury func-
tion. 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972). The results of an empirical study conducted by Professor
Blasi implicitly refute this assertion. See Blasi, supra note 49, at 259-84.
177. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725-52 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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privilege. Some grand jury investigations focus upon a confidential
source who revealed information that the government wanted kept se-
cret. 178 In such cases, the purpose of the subpoena is to identify the
source so that authorities can silence him or her. This is constitutionally
impermissible. As Justice Black wrote, "the press was protected so that
it could bare the secrets of the government and inform the people." 
179
Sources and unpublished information of institutional journalists must
have the protection of an absolute privilege necessary to ensure the flow
of information that is critical of the government.
VIII. Operation of the Privilege in Criminal, Civil, and
Administrative Proceedings
The purpose of a reporter's privilege is to protect the press from
subpoenas or other legal process compelling testimony. The privilege
would apply in both criminal and civil judicial proceedings as well as
legislative investigatory hearings. This section explains the operation of
the proposed model privilege in each of these contexts.
A. Criminal Proceedings
L Evidence Necessary to the Prosecution
An absolute reporter's privilege, applicable to all proceedings
through which the press is subject to subpoena, is appropriate given the
paramount importance of the First Amendment. Only the imminent
threat of death or serious bodily injury should defeat the privilege. The
model statute recognizes that in rare cases, conviction of a criminal de-
fendant is necessary to protect members of society from death or serious
injury. Examples of proceedings in which the exemption could apply
include grand jury investigations of bombings, and criminal trials of per-
sons accused of murder or rape, provided the court believes it is more
likely than not that, if released, the accused will repeat the crime. Courts
have ordered disclosure by reporters in such cases. 180 This exception is
178. See, eg., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1981); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1978).
179. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring);
see also Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 889, 900-01 (1986).
The First Amendment and a free press assure that the emperor's nakedness will be pointed out
when government falsely claims to be clothed in the public interest.
180. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1087 (9th Cir. 1972) (reporter ordered to
disclose information concerning threat on President Nixon's life during televised speech by
member of the Black Panthers); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1975)
(radio station manager held in contempt for refusal to disclose information about the terrorist
bombing of a Los Angeles hotel).
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justified because it protects individuals whose lives are endangered. It
also promotes continued public acceptance of the reporter's privilege. If
a serial killer or terrorist were to gain acquittal in a case in which a
reporter refused to disclose condemning information, public outrage
would likely result in repeal of the shield law. Stated in terms of a bal-
ancing test, a greater than fifty percent chance that death or serious bod-
ily injury of another person will be the direct result of the acquittal of a
criminal defendant represents a law enforcement interest even weightier
than the public's right to information under the First Amendment. This
exception is based on the clear and present danger test which permits the
suppression of speech only if the "incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion." '181
This exemption to the model statute does not destroy predictability
because it is narrow and well-defined.1" 2 Only in rare cases when the
court believes it is more likely than not that a criminal defendant, if not
confined, will directly cause death or personal injury, is the exemption
properly invoked. 8 3
2. Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights
The rights of criminal defendants should not be overlooked. First
amendment rights collide with the sixth amendment right to compulsory
process and a fair trial when the reporter's privilege is claimed in re-
sponse to a discovery request by a criminal defendant.1 84 Due to the
constitutional dimension of the criminal defendant's rights in these cases,
some courts have ordered disclosure and declared an absolute reporter's
privilege unconstitutional in the criminal defendant context."8 5 Other
181. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
182. Senator Alan Cranston's opinion on the effect of qualifications are based on their am-
biguous language and the resulting difficulty in predicting their reach. Newsmen's Privilege,
supra note 59, at 45-59. For example, in discussing an exception to the privilege when nondis-
closure would constitute a threat to human life, he said:
Moreover, what constitutes a threat to human life? Is bad meat sold to the public a
threat to human life? ... Similarly, this in turn could extend to product safety of any
kind: automobiles, flammable clothes, or unsafe power tools used in the home. A
worker in a factory might not dare reveal to a newsman that the powersaws his plant
produces are defective for fear that his identity would be revealed in court and he'd
lose his job.
Id. at 49.
183. The requirement of a greater than 50% chance of harm to human life directly caused
by the criminal defendant is not subject to the criticisms voiced by Senator Cranston in the
congressional hearings on the reporter's privilege. See Note, supra note 10, at 625-26.
184. See Monk, supra note 52, at 43.
185. See, e.g., In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978).
courts recognize a qualified privilege in this context, and reach a determi-
nation by balancing the defendant's need for confidential information
against the interests underlying the reporter's privilege.186
The interests that are affected and must be balanced in cases in
which a criminal defendant seeks discovery of a reporter's confidential
sources include more than the public's first amendment rights and the
sixth amendment rights of criminal defendants. Another important in-
terest implicated is the public's interest in law enforcement and the fair
administration of justice. Of the four interests involved, two are pro-
tected by the Constitution, and as a result carry much weight in the bal-
ancing process. The solution when the First and Sixth Amendments
collide is to sacrifice the nonconstitutional interests so that the interests
based in the Constitution can stand.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide an approach that would ef-
fect this solution. Rule 510 provides the privilege to refuse to disclose
the identity of a government informer. 18 7 An informer is defined as "a
person who has furnished information relating to or assisting in an inves-
tigation of a possible violation of law." ' The privilege is held by the
government. 189 Under Rule 510, if the judge determines that an in-
former may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of
the defendant's guilt or innocence, and the government invokes the privi-
lege, charges against the defendant are dropped.190 The model statute
adopts the approach outlined in Rule 510. The result is that the public's
interest in law enforcement is subordinated to protect and preserve con-
stitutional rights that are basic to our democratic society.
186. See People v. Troiano, 127 Misc. 2d 738, 486 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1985).
187. FED. R. EVID. 510. None of the proposed privilege rules was enacted by Congress.
Instead, Rule 501 prescribes common law privileges "as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id. Congress substituted Rule 501
for all of the specific privilege rules that were proposed in the belief that federal law should not
supersede state law in substantive areas such as privilege. SALTZBURG & MCMART1N, FED-
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 403 (5th ed. 1990). The value of the proposed rules has
been explained as follows:
What more accurate expression of the principles of the common law and of the appli-
cation of reason and experience could exist than a draft that was developed by a
representative committee of bench, bar and scholars, twice published and commented
on by the bench and bar, adopted by the Judicial Conference and finally forwarded
by the Supreme Court to Congress for promulgation.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
188. FED. R. EviD. 510(a).
189. FED. R. EVID. 510(b).
190. FED. R. EVID. 510(c)(2).
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B. Defamation and Other Civil Suits
The public's interest in an unfettered institutional press outweighs
the important interest in the fair administration of justice.191 These in-
terests of the individual and the public are paramount, 192 and thus they
should defeat individual and collective interests in recovery for civil
harms. In order to secure the primacy of this paramount right, an abso-
lute privilege in all civil suits is necessary. 93 Free speech advocates fre-
quently call for a greater use of trial-avoiding devices in civil cases194
because they distrust juries' judgments in first amendment cases, particu-
larly cases involving the media.
Traditionally, tort actions have achieved two basic goals:
(1) compensating (usually innocent) plaintiffs who have suffered
cognizable harm; and (2) imposing costs on defendants to make
them aware that their conduct has fallen below the socially accept-
able level. When damage awards achieve both goals at the same
time, the system works fairly well. There is tension, however,
when a damage award achieves only one of the goals, as is often the
case in libel law.
195
In libel law we are concerned about the chilling effect unwarranted
liability may have upon potential speakers. 196 Resolution of a libel suit
against the media may turn upon the disclosure of the source or unpub-
lished information. 197 The decision in the action brought by Ariel
Sharon against Time19" is an example in which forced disclosures of out-
takes, earlier drafts, and research and the like have resulted in substantial
awards against the media-cases in which popular, democratic jury de-
terminations have had a chilling effect upon the media.199 "[Miedia libel
law has developed into a high-stakes game that serves the [legitimate]
191. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
192. Id.
193. Monk, supra note 52, at 10 (theorizing that an absolute privilege would create at least
isolated instances in which correct disposal of the immediate litigation would be sacrificed).
194. See Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the
Cart, 35 AM. U.L. REv. 3 (1985).
195. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L.
REv. 809, 811 (1986).
196. See Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18
U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 13-22; see also Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel- A Better Alterna-
tive, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1986); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment Unraveling
the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U.L. REv. 685 (1978).
197. See, eg., Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable, Inc., 780 F.2d 340 (3d
Cir. 1985) (motion to compel discovery denied under Pennsylvania shield law; defendant
broadcast company's motion for summary judgment granted).
198. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
199. See FRANKLIN, THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF LIBEL REFORM ON REPEAT PLAYERS,
THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (E. Dennis & E. Noam eds.).
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purposes of neither the parties nor the public."2 ' ° Under the current
standard used in defamation cases,2"' a news organ that should have or
did know the falsity of the information it published may be forced to
reveal some of the material it received in confidence. To compel such
disclosure is destructive of the independence of the press2 2 and often not
truly probative.2 "3 To compel such disclosure is to declare erroneously
that the reputation interest is equal to or may be balanced against the
interest in freedom of information and speech.
The right of free speech, however, is more essential to individual and
democratic fulfillment than is the right to preserve the sanctity of one's
name. People often speak of the reputation interest in terms that focus
on the individual, 2°4 yet reputation is, by its very nature, public. Indeed,
reputation derives from the fundamental act of recognition in which the
individual "moves beyond interest and takes on the role of another."2"5
Reputation is the extension and elaboration of that recognition which lies
at the basis of our social interaction." 6 Freedom to speak is a private
interest based right; interest in reputation is other-based. Because repu-
tation is a social interest rather than a private right, it is far less impor-
tant to the process of individual fulfillment and the vitality of democratic
society than is free speech. Thus, when balancing the two rights, the
scales necessarily must fall in favor of protection of free speech over pro-
tection of the individual right.
Fortunately, in libel law, the injuries suffered by innocent plaintiffs
often can be redressed in large part by remedies other than damages. If
they had a direct way to restore their reputations, they might not be as
quick to "trigger this expensive remedy, which is generally unsuccessful
for plaintiffs and poses great danger for defendants"2 "7 and for society.
Retractions are a possible method to restore reputations. An appro-
priate retraction not only establishes the falsity of the challenged state-
200. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative, supra note 195, at 810.
201. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
202. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (right of the press to
attend trials). The Court declared that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to
constitutional protection. Iat at 582.
203. Sharon v. Time Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (press immunity from libel for
statements made about high government officials).
204. See Gertz v. Robert Welch Publishing Co., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
205. G. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SOCmTY 141 (1934).
206. Id.
207. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative, supra note 195, at 811.
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ment, but also includes publication of the correct facts.20  According to
a study performed by the University of Iowa, more than half of the plain-
tiffs in libel suits approach the media before they contact their attor-
neys.' 9 Furthermore, the study found that three-quarters of the
plaintiffs contacted the media on their own or through their attorneys
before filing their libel suits. 210 Because most plaintiffs seek corrections
immediately after the appearance of the claimed error2" and state that
they would be satisfied with a correction,2 1 2 evidence of the statement's
falsity will likely be presented to the media prior to suit. Retractions are
appropriate, however, only in cases when the evidence of falsity is clear
to the media. This remedy should not require proof of the defendant's
intent or state of mind when it published the allegedly false and defama-
tory information.
A declaratory judgment approach offers a promising remedy for li-
bel213 and would make an appropriate complement to the Model Re-
porter's Testimonial Privilege. Like the retraction, the declaratory
judgment does not concern itself with the publisher's intent or state of
mind, yet it seeks to make a harmed plaintiff whole. A declaratory judg-
ment, however, resolves cases in which the statements do not lend them-
selves to retraction because the facts are uncertain.214  Furthermore,
initiating a declaratory judgment action should itself help restore the
plaintiff's reputation, just as would the act of initiating a damage suit.
21 5
Professor Franklin has proposed a statute providing for a declara-
tory judgment remedy for libel.2 16 His proposal could be incorporated
into the proposed Reporter's Testimonial Shield Statute. His proposal
extends to non-media defendants as well, and should be appropriately
208. The adequacy of a retraction is a question within the traditional purview of the jury.
see, e.g., Boswell v. Superior Court, 125 Ariz. 307, 609 P.2d 577, 578 (1980); see also Annota-
tion, Libel and Slander: Who Is Protected by Statute Restricting Recovery Unless Retraction Is
Demanded, 84 A.L.R. 3d 1249 (1978) (discussing who is eligible to take advantage of a retrac-
tion statute). Once a defendant provides an appropriate retraction, a declaratory judgment
action is foreclosed. Damages, however, are not foreclosed.
209. Soloski, The Study and the LibelPlaintiff Who Suesfor Libel?, 71 IowA L. REv. 217,
219 (1985).
210. See id at 209 (summarizing the results of the Iowa study, which was based on inter-
views with 164 libel plaintiffs).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative, supra note 195, at 810.
214. An appropriate retraction not only establishes the falsity of the challenged statement,
but also includes publication of the correct facts.
215. See Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative, supra note 195, at 828.
216. Id
modified before inclusion in the shield statute. As modified it would
read:
SECTION 1. ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
THAT STATEMENT IS FALSE AND DEFAMATORY
(a) CAUSE OF ACTION.
(1) Any person who is the subject of any defamation may bring an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction for a declaratory
judgment that such publication or broadcast was false and
defamatory.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to require proof of the
state of mind of the defendant.
(3) No damages shall be awarded in such an action.
(b) BURDEN OF PROOF. The plaintiff seeking a declaratory
judgment under subsection (a) shall bear the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence each element of the cause of action
described in subsection (a). In an action under subsection (a), a
report of a statement made by an identified source not associated
with the defendant shall not be deemed false if it is accurately
reported.
(c) DEFENSES. Privileges that already exist at common law or
by statute, including but not limited to the privilege of fair and
accurate reporting, shall apply to actions brought under this
section.
(d) BAR TO CERTAIN CLAIMS. A plaintiff who brings an ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment under subsection (a) shall be for-
ever barred from asserting any other claim or cause of action
arising out of a publication or broadcast which is the subject of
such action.
SECTION 2. LIMITATION ON ACTION.
(a) Any action arising out of a publication or broadcast which is
alleged to be false and defamatory must be commenced not later
than one year after the first date of such publication or broadcast.
(b) It shall be a complete defense to an action brought under Sec-
tion 1 that the defendant published or broadcast an appropriate
retraction before the action was filed.
(c) No pretrial discovery of any sort shall be allowed in any action
brought under Section 1.
SECTION 3. PROOF AND RECOVERY IN DAMAGE
ACTIONS.
(a) In any action for damages for libel or slander or false-light in-
vasion of privacy, the plaintiff may recover no damages unless the
plaintiff proves both falsity and actual malice by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
(b) Punitive damages may not be awarded in any action for libel or
slander or false-light invasion of privacy.
(c) A plaintiff who brings an action for damages for libel or slan-
der or false-light invasion of privacy shall be forever barred from
asserting any other claim or cause of action arising out of a publi-
cation or broadcast which is the subject of such action.
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SECTION 4. ATTORNEY'S FEES.
(a) GENERAL RULE. Except as provided in subsection (b), in
any action arising out of a publication or broadcast which is al-
leged to be false and defamatory, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
(b) EXCEPTIONS:
(1) In an action for damages, a prevailing defendant shall not be
awarded attorney's fees if the plaintiff sustained special damages
and the action is found to have been brought and maintained with
a reasonable chance of success.
(2) In an action brought under Section 1, a prevailing plaintiff
shall not be awarded attorney's fees if the plaintiff has prevailed on
the basis of evidence that it did not present, or formally try to pres-
ent, to the defendant before the action was filed.
(3) In any action brought under Section 1 in which the defendant
has made an appropriate retraction after the filing of suit, the
plaintiff shall be treated as the prevailing party up to that point and
the defendant shall be treated as the prevailing party after that
point.217
It is likely that the creation of a declaratory judgment action and the
elimination of most damages for libel will cause the number of libel suits
to decrease and the percentage of retractions issued by libel defendants to
increase. A quick determination of falsity might appeal to both sides.
Defendants would be less threatened due to the reduction of available
damages and the likelihood that defendants themselves may recover if
plaintiff fails to prove its case. The public's awareness of the availability
of non-monetary recovery will make the public and juries suspicious of
plaintiffs who sue for absurdly high damage awards.
Any retraction the defendant publishes after the plaintiff begins a
declaratory judgment action is not a complete defense. Instead, the de-
fendant is treated as the prevailing party after the retraction and may
recover attorney's fees. This provision encourages the plaintiff to settle
once the defendant issues a retraction. Awarding fees to the prevailing
party discourages abuse of the law and encourages good-faith discus-
sions. This is particularly true because the rule establishes that a winning
plaintiff can not obtain fees if he or she has not disclosed his or her essen-
tial evidence of falsity to the defendant prior to seeking a declaratory
judgment.
This privilege would also protect defendants from being sued merely
for publishing statements made by another, because they never vouched
for the truth of the statements. Otherwise, the declaratory judgment ac-
tion could be used to put the defendant in the position of having to de-
217. Id. at 812-13. Franklin would extend these protections to non-media defendants as
well. Id at 815.
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fend the truth of another's statement. Furthermore, when the originator
of the statement is unknown, the press should be protected. The under-
lying rationale of the doctrine is to diminish the chill on media defend-
ants while preserving the interest in protecting the individual's
reputation.218
The retraction, although important, is not the prime benefit of the
declaratory judgment action. The declaratory judgment approach serves
first amendment interests because it relies on an authoritative and unin-
trusive determination of the truth of the plaintiff's allegation, vindicating
the plaintiff's reputation without intruding into the newsroom. Reputa-
tion can be restored without assessing exorbitant money damages that
restrict the press and free speech.
The adoption of both the Model Reporter's Testimonial Privilege
and the declaratory judgment response to libel would protect the First
Amendment and heed the Supreme Court's admonition about the dan-
gers of an absolute privilege for falsehood:
[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the
premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner
in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which "are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.... ." Hence the knowingly false statement and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection.219
C. Legislative and Executive Investigatory Hearings
In contrast to judicial proceedings, the function of executive and
legislative investigatory hearings is not to administer justice, but to ob-
tain information related to legislative matters.220
The information gained at legislative and executive hearings may
facilitate better decision-making and serve as a public first amendment
resource. The institutional press, however, is the primary source of in-
218. See Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In
Greenmoss the Court held that Gertz did not apply to a case between a company and a credit
reporting agency. The agency falsely reported to five subscribers that the plaintiff had filed for
bankruptcy. The Court held that the private plaintiff did not have to show actual malice in
order to recover presumed damages or punitive damages because the false report was not a
matter of public concern.
219. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (citation omitted).
220. H. NELSON & D. TECTER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 418 (1986).
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formation to the public whereas executive and legislative hearings are
secondary. Also, confidential sources, so important to government re-
porting, would dry up if potential sources could not predict with cer-
tainty whether their identities would be revealed at hearings conducted
by the government.
In two cases concerning reporters who refused to disclose informa-
tion, Congress declined to hold the reporters in contempt.221 This action
reveals that Congress itself considers the First Amendment to be more
sacred than its own investigatory abilities. For the same reason, the
model statute proposes an absolute reporter's privilege in the context of
legislative hearings.
Conclusion
Given the central importance of the First Amendment to the indi-
vidual and to our polity, it is important that we act to protect the ability
of the media to disseminate a broad spectrum of information. Confiden-
tial sources are an important source of news, especially news concerning
the government, minority views, and international matters. Sources will
not confide in reporters unless they are assured by the law that the com-
munication will remain confidential.
In order to encourage communications of confidential information
to the press, we urge Congress to enact the legislation proposed in this
paper: a uniform federal reporter's testimonial privilege that is near ab-
solute. Qualified privileges require balancing, and thus do not insure that
a reporter's sources will be protected. The need for outcome predictabil-
ity is the foundation of the Proposed Privilege.
221. In 1966, the House of Representatives Commerce Committee investigated charges
that the CBS television documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," distorted military man-
agement and operations. When CBS president Frank Stanton refused to cooperate by provid-
ing information, the committee voted 25 to 13 to recommend to Congress that a contempt
citation be issued to him. Congress, however, refused the recommendation. A 1987 Congres-
sional investigation focused on Daniel Schorr's broadcast of some of the contents of a secret
House Intelligence Committee report on CIA operations. Although Schorr refused to disclose
the source of the report, the investigating committee did not recommend a contempt citation.
Id. at 416-18.
